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DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 
HughJ. McCann 
Libertarian treatments of free will face the objection that an uncaused 
human decision would lack full explanation, and hence violate the principle 
of sufficient reason. It is argued that this difficulty can be overcome if God, 
as creator, wills that I decide as I do, since my decision could then be 
explained in terms of his will, which must be for the best. It is further 
argued that this view does not make God the author of evil in any damag-
ing sense. Neither does it impugn my freedom. God's creative activity 
does not put in place any secondary causes that determine my decision; 
and his will does not stand as an independent determining condition either, 
since it is fully expressed in my decision alone. 
Libertarian treatments of free will are often held to involve a violation of 
the principle of Sufficient Reason: they purport to explain my choices in 
terms of my motives and beliefs, but they are ultimately unable to explain 
why I chose as I did for the reasons I did, rather than making an opposite 
choice for opposite reasons. One possible solution to this problem is to 
invoke divine sovereignty. If, as creator, Cod is responsible for my choices, 
then even though they are not subject to deterministic law they still have a 
full explanation. For if my own reasons for choosing as I do are not com-
pletely explanatory, Cod's reasons for ordaining that I shall so choose pre-
sumablyare. And there are independent theological grounds for thinking 
Cod is sovereign in this way. But there are two major objections to be 
faced. One has to do with the problem of evil. Libertarian theories of free-
dom are attractive in part because they promise to exonerate Cod from 
responsibility for moral evil. But if He creates our choices, then it seems 
He must be responsible for any evil they involve. The second objection is 
related: it may be wondered how I can even claim to have libertarian free-
dom and at the same time hold that Cod has complete sovereignty over 
every exercise of my will. I shall spend more time with this objection. I 
think it can be answered at least in part, and I want to suggest a way in 
which it might be defused completely. 
l. The Libertarian's Problem 
Claims of libertarian freedom may be made both for the mental act of 
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forming an intention and for the volitional activity by which the intention 
gets executed, but since the former presents the clearer case, I shall concen-
trate on it. Paradigmatically, we form intentions through acts of decision, 
which terminate episodes of practical reasoning. This does not mean 
every decision must be preceded by lengthy deliberation, but it does mean 
that decisions are not made blindly. However quick or careless they may 
be, they are taken in light of considerations that offer at least putative justi-
fication for them, and which provide ingredients for explaining both the 
decision itself and the action that ensues. If, for example, I wish to decide 
where to take a vacation, I need to be aware of some options, and of the 
considerations that make them attractive. A trip to Colorado might appeal 
to me because it affords the chance to go skiing; a visit to New York might 
present desirable cultural opportunities. Let us suppose I decide on 
Colorado. The considerations on which my decision is founded may be 
summarized in a practical syllogism: 
Would that I go skiing. 
I can go skiing if I vacation in Colorado. 
Therefore, I shall vacation in Colorado. 
It is important to realize that this is only a summary. There may be 
numerous aspects to a skiing trip that I find attractive, and I may have in 
mind a fairly detailed plan for the proposed vacation.' In other respects, 
this sort of practical syllogism seems to me to reflect pretty well the impor-
tant features of reasoning to a decision. In particular, we should note that 
this is not a piece of theoretical reasoning, made practical by its content. It 
is practical through and through. The major premise is optative: it 
expresses, not a belief on my part that a skiing trip would be desirable, but 
rather the actual desire with which I experience the prospect of such a trip. 
The minor premise encapsulates the plan I envision as achieving what I 
desire. And the conclusion, which is thought in the modality of deciding, 
records what I decide in light of the premises, which becomes the content 
of the intention thereby formed. 
This view of decision making fits well with libertarian accounts of free-
dom. Practical reasoning is made practical not by its subject matter or 
underlying motivation, but by the very nature of the thinking that consti-
tutes it. To reason practically is to be a decider, to be a settler of issues.' 
And because decisions are not made blindly but rather require premises, a 
decision is never a completely arbitrary event, bereft of any explanation. 
For to think of anything in the optative mode is to perceive it as in some 
way good, and we decide only in light of our optations.' The upshot of this 
is that we form intentions only in light of a perceived good, and the inten-
tion formed by our decision is always to pursue the envisioned good that 
prompted the decision. Hence even if deciding is an act exempt from 
deterministic laws there will always be some explanation for it: a teleologi-
cal explanation in terms of the putative good, and the envisioned means of 
achieving it, that prompted the decision. 
But how good an explanation? Proponents of determinist theories offer 
two major complaints. The first concerns the connection between the 
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premises of our practical syllogism and its conclusion. In order for the 
premises to explain my decision to vacation in Colorado, they must consti-
tute the reason for which I decided to go. And this is not guaranteed by the 
mere fact that they accompany my decision. After all, I might have had 
other reasons for vacationing in Colorado-for example, an obligation to 
visit a relative-which did not figure in my deliberation at all. If not, then I 
will have decided on the vacation for the sake of the skiing, but not for the 
sake of satisfying my obligation. And, it is argued, the only \'>'ay to make 
sense of the "for" here is to invoke nomic causation. The premises of our 
practical syllogism can constitute the reasons for which I decided only if 
the mental states of which they form the content caused me to decide. 
Otherwise, my decision arises without any relation to my reasons, and so 
cannot be explained by them.' 
I cannot argue fully for it here, but I think this objection can be given a 
satisfactory answer. What makes a set of reasons count as those for which 
a decision is made is that the plan of action those reasons encapsulate 
becomes the content of the resultant intention. My decision to vacation in 
Colorado must, as we have seen, be made in awareness of motives and 
beliefs that putatively justify it, and which, depending on their complexity, 
embody a more or less developed plan of action. When I decide for these 
reasons, that plan is conveyed into my intention: that is, the content of my 
motives and beliefs is transformed into the content of my intention. 
Furthermore, this occurs in such a way that those elements of the plan that 
were the focus of my desire become the focus of my intention. If it is the 
prospect of skiing that prompts me to go to Colorado, then my primary 
intention in going will be to ski. If I saw other aspects of such a trip as 
desirable-say, enjoying the mountain landscape-then that too will be 
intended. Things I did not even think of, like visiting a relative, will not be 
part of the plan and will not be intended at all. Finally, there will be those 
elements of the plan I see as necessary to success, and hence voluntarily 
accept, but which I do not desire, and perhaps even find undesirable, such 
as driving on icy roads. These too enter the content of my intention, but 
not as its primary focus. They are, as Bentham would say, obliquely rather 
than directly intended.s In short, the structure of an intention reflects exact-
ly the structure of the reasons for which it is formed. That is why we can 
always tell an agent's reasons for a decision simply by investigating the 
content of the resultant intention, and vice versa. To know what I mean to 
accomplish by visiting Colorado is to know my reasons for deciding to go 
there, and to know my reasons for I deciding is to know what J intended to 
achieve. And of course none of this calls for relations of nomic causation." 
If this is correct, then we have an account of what it is to decide for a 
reason that does not run afoul of causal determination. So we can give 
noncausal explanations of decisions in terms of the agents' reasons without 
fear of invoking an underlying causal explanation. But the determinist can 
still claim the explanation is inadequate, and that is the second objection 
libertarians must face. Even if deciding requires that I be aware of options, 
to say that my decision is undetermined is to say that my awareness of 
those options, and the putative good of them, cannot finally explain my 
decision. If I am free in the libertarian sense, then there is nothing in my 
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nature or experience, nothing about the setting in which my decision 
occurs, in terms of which an observer could reach a completely reliable 
conclusion as to how the decision would go. And, the argument runs, to 
the extent this is so we get a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. 
Why should we have a world in which I reached this decision but not 
another? After all, the cultural opportunities provided by New York gave 
me good reason for vacationing there instead. Why, then, the decision to 
go to Colorado? We can point, if we want, to the putative good I saw in 
going there: the excitement of skiing, the beauty of the mountains, etc. But 
of course there was putative good on the other side, too. And when the 
question is why I opted in favor of one good rather than another-why I 
chose Colorado for the sake of these reasons, rather than New York for the 
sake of those-we seem to have no truly satisfying answer. I need not 
have desired one course more than the other, and if I am free then ex 
hypothesi that would not have settled things anyway. Nor can I be relied 
upon always to do what I take to be best or obligatory, if those turn out to 
be different from what I desire. In the end, then, the only reason we can 
give for my settling upon Colorado is that that is what I decided. And that 
is not enough. It is to say we could as well have had a different world, and 
to offer no decisive rationale for the one we have.7 
II. A Theistic Solution 
There is no denying the seriousness of this problem. In the physical 
realm, satisfying explanations tend to be deterministic: they treat nature as 
determining behavior. But if libertarianism is correct, things are the other 
way around with us: certain of our actions-that is, our decisions-deter-
mine our nature. They set our projects, thereby forming our character and 
structuring our lives. To surrender this point is to give up libertarianism. 
But neither should one be satisfied with a situation where rational deci-
sions count irretrievably as violations of Sufficient Reason-a principle 
which, in the philosophy of religion especially, counts for too much to be 
lightly set aside.' There is, however, a solution which if successful would 
allow us to have things both ways. Suppose that God, as creator, is direct-
ly responsible for each of my decisions. If so, then even though my deci-
sion to vacation in Colorado was not determined by the rest of my nature, 
it still has an accounting-an accounting in terms of God's plans, of the 
good He sees in my deciding as 1 do. That is to say, what fully accounts for 
my decision is not my reasons for it, but God's. 
This may seem a desperate solution: dangerous in its theology, whimsi-
cal in its view of the world, and faced with decisive objections. But I want 
to argue it is none of these things. Its theological credentials are actually 
pretty good. There is scriptural backing in the God who hardens 
Pharaoh's heart (Exodus 10:1), who is said by Isaiah to have wrought all our 
works in us (Isaiah 26:12), and by Paul to work in us both to will and to do 
of His good pleasure (Philippiilns 2:13). Such passages have often been seen 
as requiring that God's agency underlie our own. Aquinas, in particular, 
cites the Isaiah passage as requiring that God cause not just the power of 
the will, but also its movement.9 But Aquinas does not see this as under-
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mining our freedom; rather, he views God as an agent able to move the 
will without violence. lO As first cause, God moves all causes both natural 
and voluntary. 
And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their 
actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He 
does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He 
the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing 
according to its own nature. 11 
As for whimsicality, that would be a legitimate concern if the aim of this 
view was to treat human decisions as related to God's creative activity in a 
way different from other events-to call, that is, for exceptional creative 
involvement on God's part, as an ad hoc device to make human decisions 
fully explicable. But that was not Aquinas's position, nor is it mine. Just 
the opposite: the aim is to place human decisions on a footing equal with 
the rest of creation, as direct manifestations of the divine fiat in which all of 
the world, in all of its history, is produced. Only such an understanding 
accords God complete sovereignty as creator, and brings all that occurs 
under His providence. For to the extent God does not exert active control 
over my decisions, whether through other events or direct involvement, 
He does not control them at all. He can therefore achieve His ends only by 
reacting to what I do, and to that extent His plans are subordinated to 
mine. In addition to weakening His sovereignty, this situation also threat-
ens Cod's omniscience. It suggests He can know how I will act in the cir-
cumstances in which I am placed only by observing my actions. As cre-
ator, He is in the dark. He can know what the possibilities are, but if my 
freedom makes for more than one, then even His knowledge of the world 
He is creating appears to depend on my action-an unsatisfactory situa-
tion to say the least. 12 These problems can be avoided if God is able to exer-
cise creative control in mv actual choicE'. 
So divine sovereignty requires that God be in full control of my deci-
sions. A sound understanding of creation seems to lead to the same out-
come. The important thing to realize here is that Cod's creative activity is 
as fully involved in the continued existence of the universe as with its 
beginning, if it had one. That is, God's sustaining the universe is of a piece 
with His producing it. There is no power of things to sustain themselves in 
existence. Such a power would have to be a pure disposition, lacking any 
supervenience base and any mechanism, active or passive, by which it 
operated. There is no difference, definable or observable, between this sort 
of power and no power at all. It is the eternal creative act of God which 
alone is responsible for the existence of things, and the world's surviving 
another second will be as much owing to God's creative activity as its 
being here to begin with.n It is hard to see, however, how God can be 
responsible for my existence at every moment without being responsible 
also for my characteristics. As Malebranche observed, God cannot create a 
physical object that is in no particular place, that is neither at rest nor in 
motion, etc. All of these things need to be settled in the production of the 
object. 14 And in the same way, it would seem, God cannot create me with 
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an indeterminate will-that is, a will that is neither deciding to A nor not 
deciding to A, that is neither committed to a given intention nor not so 
committed, etc. So if my existence at the moment I decide to visit Colorado 
is directly owing to God as creator, then so is my decision. 
This view of creation does not, as far as I can see, undermine scientific 
explanation. To say that God is entirely responsible for the existence of 
things is not to say those things have no nature, or that the changes and 
interactions they undergo cannot be described by scientific law. It does, 
however, enable us to close the explanatory gap that attends libertarian 
free choice. As far as its existence is concerned, my decision to vacation in 
Colorado has the same cause any other event does-namely, God's cre-
ative action. What is different about it is that unlike physical events, it can-
not be foreseen simply by knowing the nature of its accompanying events 
or circumstances, even the deliberative events and states that precede and 
accompany it. Instead, its character is settled only in the very event itself, 
in the very deciding. My reasons permit a partial account of it, in terms of 
the good I saw in this scenario of action. But they cannot explain it fully, 
for as far as my own motives go I could have chosen otherwise. I might 
have chosen some other course, in pursuit of some other good, with no 
final justification for the choice. But if my decision is not just a manifesta-
tion of my ability to choose, but also of God's creativity, then His goodness 
and knowledge can be invoked to fill this gap. He has a reason why I 
should decide to vacation in Colorado, and unlike mine His reason will be 
sufficient. For in contrast to me, God is fully aware of the ramifications of 
all the choices J might make, and His perfect goodness ensures that He will 
create only the best. 's So His reasons for having me decide as I do, whatev-
er they are, will explain fully the occurrence of my decision, in terms of His 
perfect goodness. 
Admittedly, this does not tell us what are God's reasons for producing a 
world in which I make the decisions I do. And in this life anyway, we may 
not be optimistic about our ability to discern those reasons. Still less does it 
provide what the determinist wants, which is a complete naturalistic expla-
nation for my decisions. Nevertheless, I think it provides for a more satis-
fying version of libertarianism than is usually offered. If libertarian free 
choice exists, then the sort of explanation the determinist wants for my 
decisions-that is, a naturalistic explanation-is unavailable. And if the 
alternative I am suggesting does not actually produce explanations for free 
choices, it at least assures that there arc such explanations. It is this assur-
ance, not the actual explanations, that is crucial to answering the objection 
that libertarian free choice violates Sufficient Reason. Naturally, one can be 
satisfied with the account only to the extent one accepts a theistic view of 
the world. But within that context, it is reasonable to expect such an 
account. The idea that there could exist a being like the Judeo-Christian 
God, and yet that His existence should be dispensable to our understand-
ing of the phenomena of the world strikes me as implausible, to put it 
mildly. If the account of freedom I am suggesting works, then God's exis-
tence does make a difference: it lays to rest the most important objection to 
libertarian freedom. That in itself would be an argument for theism. 
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III. Moral Evil 
But does the account work? There are two major objections that have to 
be faced. One has to do with the problem of evil. Perhaps the most tempt-
ing theological reason for endorsing a libertarian view of the will is that 
this appears to exempt God from blame for the moral evil in the world. If 
the existence of our acts of will is entirely our doing and none of God's, 
then He seems exempt from direct responsibility for any evil they involve. 
He no doubt knew that in creating free beings He was risking moral evil. 
Perhaps somehow He even foresaw as creator that it would appear. But 
God's own will is not tainted by moral evil, for He never willed any of it. 
We did that. The most God is responsible for is permitting us to do so. 
Now the trouble with making our decisions the direct products of God's 
creative activity is that it seems to undo this argument. Indeed, on the 
view of creation I have presented God is directly responsible not just for 
our forming evil intentions, but also for their execution, and for all the evil 
consequences that result. How can a God this intimately involved in cre-
ation escape guilt for what is wrong in it? Certainly, on this account, He 
would have to be the creator of sin itself. 
Part of the answer to this objection is to realize that even the standard 
free will defense does not exempt God from as much involvement in the 
travails of the world as might be supposed. If we think of the category of 
moral evil as covering not just wrong acts of will but also the harmful con-
sequences that flow from them, we include in it much that involves natural 
processes, and hence their creator. Suppose, for example, that I decide to 
set fire to a church, and proceed to do so, causing great harm to those 
inside. Whatever acts of will occur in this case, they would have no effect 
without there being natural processes relating them to the ensuing harm. 
And however we conceive those processes, God is involved. By my 
account He is directly involved, being solely responsible for the existence 
of all that is. That places the consequences of my acts of will very much on 
a par with natural evil, for a lot of which God is presumably responsible in 
any case. Would another view fare better? Not much. Even if we think of 
God as only remotely involved in the production of natural events, my evil 
decision cannot be efficacious without His cooperation. The world has to 
allow methods by which I can conveniently set a fire; there must be oxy-
gen available so that the church will burn; fire must be harmful to my vic-
tims; I have to survive from the moment I make the decision until I exe-
cute it, and the acts of will by which I do so must somehow yield the bodi-
ly motions through which I set the blaze. In none of these things is human 
agency heavily involved, and in some it is not involved at all. But God's is: 
it is He who made the world, and set in place its principles of operation; it 
is He who sustains natural causes, or allows them to sustain themselves; it 
is He who made those causes oblivious to my evil intentions, and who 
refuses to intervene Himself to thwart my designs. On no account, then, 
does God escape involvement in the consequences of my evil intentions. 
In fact, by comparison with the degree of His involvement, mine seems rel-
atively puny. 
But what about my decision itself? Here, surely, is the true home of 
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moral evil. Even if I had dropped dead an instant after making the deci-
sion moral evil would have occurred, whereas there would have been no 
moral evil had the church burned because it was struck by lightening. So 
moral evil lies preeminently in our deciding: in our adopting plans of 
action that are wrong. Can God be exempt from being morally evil 
Himself if it is by His creative fiat that we decide as we do? Of course He 
can. In the first place, even though God creates me the person who decides 
to burn down the church, He does not make my decision. I do. My deci-
sion, and any evil that lies with it, are predicated of me. What belongs to 
God is His willing that I shall decide as I do, which is an altogether differ-
ent matter. The plan God adopts in willing what I shall decide will be infi-
nitely more detailed and extensive than mine, and His project far different. 
To be sure, His plan will include my decision and, if He means for my plan 
to succeed, its harmful consequences as well. But these need hardly be the 
point of His plan. They may only be obliquely intended, as necessary to 
some superior good God wishes to accomplish. There may in fact be com-
pelling possibilities for the ultimate defeat of evil bound up with my will-
ing wrongly. If so, then God's goodness is no more impugned by His cre-
ating me the person who decides as I do than a mother's goodness is 
impugned by giving her sick child bitter medicine, or an employer is made 
evil when business reverses force him to reduce his work force. 
This approach to the problem of evil seems to me preferable to the stan-
dani free will defense. Besides diminishing God's sovereignty, the stan-
dard treatment raises difficulties about the extent to which, as creator, God 
knows what he is about. And it still makes God responsible for creating a 
world in which moral evil occurs, for allowing immoral choices in that 
world, and for contributing as creator to their harmful consequences. It 
seems to me that the same considerations that justify God in this degree of 
involvement in moral evil would also justify his obliquely intending it, as 
an inescapable part of a plan of creation the entirety of which is effected by 
His creative will. If that is correct, then God's being the author of our free 
choices does not preclude a satisfactory response to the problem of evil, 
and it avoids the difficulties of the standard treatment. 
IV. Sovereignty and Worldly Freedom 
The second objection this view must face is that it provides for a full 
explanation of our decisions only by finally destroying our freedom. The 
whole point of libertarian freedom is that my actions are supposed to be 
"up to me," in the sense that I am their author or originator, and I am 
responsible for their occurrence. The thrust of the present view is that God 
originates my decisions and actions, simply by creating me the person I 
am. And it may well be doubted whether these two can be made compati-
ble-whether, to paraphrase Aquinas, God can be the first cause of the 
operations of my will, while I remain their voluntary agent. If He brings 
about my decision to vacation in Colorado, the argument would run, then 
surely I cannot decide otherwise, and similarly for burning down the 
church. Hence I am not responsible for these deeds. 
There is, of course, a quick answer available here. If what is meant by 
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"freedom" in this objection is simply that my acts of intention formation 
should not be subject to nomic determinism, then ex hypothesi I am free on 
the view presented. My motives still influence my decision rather than 
determining it, and making God the first mover of my will does not (as we 
shall see more fully below) put in place some further event or mechanism 
to which my decision is bound by natural law. If, on the other hand, free-
dom is supposed to include my being able to choose against God's creative 
will for me, then this is a freedom neither the present view of creation nor 
any other accords me. Indeed, short of God's action as creator, there is no 
me to do any deciding, and the same act of His will that is responsible for 
my being puts in place my decisions as well. Furthermore, this second sort 
of freedom is surely something no one should ever want anyway. What 
greater evidence of our fallenness could there be than the desire to be mas-
ters of our destinies in the way this sort of freedom implies? 
But I do not think the objector would be satisfied. Perhaps there is a 
possibility, remote as it may seem, that God as creator has no fully settled 
will regarding our decisions, and so leaves indeterminate the world He 
creates. If so, then even though our wrong decisions are not what He 
would like, they do not oppose anything He actively wills for us. And it 
might be thought that this is necessary, for even if making God the creator 
of our choices does not raise problems of nomic determination, it could still 
endanger our autonomy. Libertarian freedom requires more than the 
absence of nomic determination. I could be involved in all sorts of unde-
termined events, even psychological ones, without any sense of freedom. I 
could suddenly remember an old phone number, say, or have an accurate 
vision of The Hermitage in May. And we can imagine that these events are 
truly undetermined. It hardly follows that I would have the sense of 
autonomy and control about them that I have about my decisions. More 
likely I would feel they had befallen me, in ITmch the way other sudden 
memories and insights do. The same does not hold of the operations of the 
will. There is a subjective sense of freedom attending our decisions and 
actions that does not accompany other experiences, regardless of whether 
they are nomically determined. The real question is whether that sense of 
freedom is justified if God, as creator, controls our decisions. To see 
whether it is, we have to examine some of the elements in which it consists. 
One of the most important aspects of the sense of freedom that attends 
our decisions is intentionality. There is no such thing as an unintentional 
decision. Rather, whenever we decide we mean to decide, and we mean to 
decide exactly as we do: that is, we mean to form the very intention there-
by formed. So when I decide to vacation in Colorado, I intend in so doing 
to decide exactly that. A second and related point is that I would not take 
my decision to be accidental. On the contrary: it is a self-contradiction 
ever to assert of anyone that they accidentally, or inadvertently, or uninten-
tionally decided to do anything. My decisions cannot befall me, or occur 
by mistake; they have to be under my direction. '6 Or at least that is how 
we take it to be, and because we do we are able to view deciding as a locus 
of voluntary control by agents over their actions. When I decide to vaca-
tion in Colorado, I take myself to be exerting such control, to be settling the 
issue of where, barring the unforeseen, I shall go. Part of this control lies in 
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a fact noted earlier: that I always decide in cognizance of available options. 
That is one of the things that prevents my being surprised by my decision.'7 
But it is not all. When I decide, I see myself as a center of spontaneity in 
the world. Rather than being controlled by my circumstances, I see myself 
as exerting control over them. In particular, I see myself as freely deter-
mining which of my motives shall find fulfillment in my behavior. And 
what makes this freedom libertarian is that in deciding, I see myself as con-
trolling my decision itself: as settling the issue of whether it shall occur at 
all, and what its content shall be. So when I decide to take my vacation in 
Colorado, I am determining in that very act not just what I shall do about 
my vacation, but also what I shall decide about it. That is what is implicit 
in my decisions being intrinsically intentional and nonaccidental. If they 
were not so our decisions would be things that befall us, and libertarian 
freedom would reduce, even from the point of view of the agent, to blind 
happenstance. 
I take these features of deciding to be grounded in the phenomenology 
of intention-that is, in the way it seems to us. And they are reflected in 
the concept, in the fact that we never hear of anyone deciding to do some-
thing unintentionally or by accident. But of course they may be illusory. 
For if I am to be the source of my decisions in this way, certain relations 
between them and other events and states are ruled out, and whether such 
relations obtain need not at all be phenomenally apparent to me. It is pre-
cisely for this reason that causal determinism stands as a threat to libertari-
an freedom. If the standard determinist account is true, then however 
things may seem to me, my nature is so constituted that there are nomic 
relations between my decisions and my motivational and belief states in 
terms of which the latter explain the former. This is altogether different 
from the situation with the practical syllogism, where it is the content of my 
motive and belief states that explain my decision, and the explanation is 
teleologicaL Here the states themselves do the explaining, and the expla-
nation is nomological. That destroys libertarian freedom, because the 
motives and beliefs in question antedate my decision, are sufficient for it, 
and display none of the features of agency that have been described. T 
could have no direct control over whether and what I decide once these 
factors are finally in place." Far from my being able to control their influ-
ence through my decision, they are in fact controlling me. We might even 
wish to say that if determinism is true then whatever the phenomenal 
appearances may be, we never really decide anything. 
Can the same sort of claim be made if God creates me the person who 
decides as I do? I would urge that it cannot. In the first place, God's activi-
ty as creator does not antedate anything I do. One reason for this is His 
eternity. In my understanding, God is a timelessly eternal being, who cre-
ates the entire world, including time itself, in a single act. The divine fiat is 
the ontological foundation of my decisions, therefore, it cannot bear any 
temporal relation whatever to them. Furthermore, the relationship 
between my decisions and God's activity as creator is too close for there to 
be temporal differences. Neither our acts of will nor anything else God 
creates, including we ourselves, can be held to have existence independent 
of God's act of creating us. God does not create us by engaging in an act of 
592 SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM 
will which in turn produces us. That would require that there be princi-
ples of "laws" of creation governing the relationship between his action 
and its products. If God were dependent on such laws in creation, His sov-
ereignty would be impugned. If, on the other hand, He produced these 
principles, or some mechanism of creation whose operation they record, 
He might as well skip the intervening step and produce us directly. So 
God does not create us or our works by means of commanding our exis-
tence, where this is conceived as a kind of causal device. Rather, His com-
manding our existence is our production, and we have our being in His 
very act of creating us. 
One upshot of this is that I cannot be done violence, either directly or 
indirectly, by the creative act of God that puts my decisions in place. 
Independently of the fiat that determines my decision to visit Colorado, I 
have no existence whatever; nor is there any process, natural or otherwise, 
through which the determination occurs. Nomically speaking, therefore, 
my decision is still as free as it can be, and I am in no way acted upon in 
reaching it. There is nothing else I would, or even could, have decided had 
God not exercised His power, no process of practical reasoning with which 
that power interferes, no duress under which I am placed. On the con-
trary, because the decision God wills for me is truly mine I really do deter-
mine, at least as far as any considerations having to do with this world are 
concerned, what my course of action shall be. I decide in cognizance of the 
options before me, and in light of my motives and beliefs about them. It is 
in my decision that the question which of my motives I will attempt to ful-
fill is settled. And I have every right to feel spontaneous and controlling in 
making the decision-again, at least as far as any natural considerations 
go. For like all decisions, my decision to visit Colorado is intrinsically 
intentional: in making it I mean to decide, and to decide as I do. In the 
very occurrence of my decision, I actively and voluntarily commit myself 
to it. Finally, because my decision is made in light of my reasons, it both 
reflects and helps further to form my character. Hence there is every rea-
son for myself and others to consider me responsible for it, and the good or 
evil it may involve, and to try to encourage or discourage similar decisions 
on my part in the future. J'i 
V. Sovereignty and Freedom Before God 
The above account may be viewed as a partial gloss on Aquinas' claim 
that God wills the operation of our practical faculties in accordance with 
our voluntary nature, and is in fact the cause of our choices being free. By 
willing that we engage in acts that have the intrinsic features of decision, 
God enables us to exercise spontaneous and voluntary control over our 
worldly situation, while at the same time His own involvement prevents 
the principle of Sufficient Reason from being violated. But it is too soon for 
the libertarian to declare victory. For even if this account leaves me free 
and in control of my decisions as far as secondary causes are concerned, it 
does not place me in control of God's will, and His role in my decision may 
be such as finally to destroy my responsibility. If, as I have claimed, God is 
the ground of my entire being, then certainly I could not have made any 
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decision at all but for His actively willing that I do so. And does this not 
finally undo me? Even if, in deciding, I intentionally decide as I do, and 
even if in so doing I settle the issue of my behavior as far as the world is 
concerned, it seems clear that I do not settle it as far as God is concerned. I 
am, it appears, nothing but His proxy in the whole business. And this 
seems to destroy my freedom. However controlling my decision may have 
been, it did not control God. So, all things considered, I could not have 
done otherwise. 
What is demanded here is a kind of absolute metaphysical freedom: a 
situation in which, even though I am by nature limited in both knowledge 
and appreciation of my actions and their consequences, I nevertheless 
stand as their final ontological arbiter. One could argue that this kind of 
freedom is necessary even for worldly responsibility: that as long as there 
is a God behind the scenes directing my behavior, I am not accountable for 
it even on earth. But the demand seems especially appropriate in the reli-
gious context, where typically I am viewed as responsible not just to other 
creatures but to God Himself. We are not, after all, like characters in a 
novel, whose transactions occur entirely within its boundaries. There, no 
doubt, the author may make her characters free or determined as she 
pleases, since in neither case will they offend against her or us. Their free-
dom will be as real as they are, and the critics will not complain that it is 
bogus, in that all along it was the author who made the characters do what 
they did. But with us it is different. When we choose, we transact with our 
creator. Even in this world He is said to reward or punish our deeds, and 
in the Christian as well as many other religious contexts we have an eternal 
destiny for which we are responsible. And we might wonder how this is 
possible if we are not the ultimate cause of our choices. If we can only 
decide as God wills we decide, it seems unfair that He should allow us to 
suffer for our choices. We cannot resist His will. So why, as Paul has the 
Christians at Rome asking, does He still find fault? (Romans 9:19) 
I do not know that I can offer a complete solution to this difficulty, but I 
think it is possible to make real progress with it. It is based, I think, on a 
misconception of the relationship between our own wills and God's in cre-
ating us. Our inclination is to think any exercise of God's will would have 
to be separate from our own, and hence must stand as an independent con-
dition given which our choices are fixed. And then, whether we choose to 
call it nomic or not, we still seem to have a brand of determinism. Even 
though the same fiat that puts my choices in place determines my very 
existence, and even though this precludes violence being done to my will, 
there is nevertheless an event-namely the exercise of God's own will-
given which my decision could not have been other than it was. And 
whatever we might want to say about the temporal world, this appears to 
undercut any legitimate claim that we are responsible on the eternal stage. 
No doubt God, who owes us nothing, may save or condemn as He sees fit. 
But desert is another matter, and)f that requires that we be free, the argu-
ment would run, then even divine determination must rule out free will. 
I want to urge, however, that God's creative determination of my deci-
sions does not rule out their being free, for in fact the determination and the 
decision are one and the same. It was remarked above that the fiat of ere-
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ation cannot be viewed as a separate event from the effects produced in it, 
since that would simply require a further exercise of divine agency to assure 
that the supposed effect was produced. But what exactly is the relation 
between creation and the created? If we take at face value the idea that 
God's activity as creator can be modeled as a kind of command, then it 
should be viewed as an exercise of will, not unlike our own exercise of will 
when we make a decision. The difference is that whereas our willing, taken 
in itself, has only mental import, the import of God's willing is real. We, 
that is to say, and all that belongs to us exist not as metaphysical products of 
God's willing, but as its content. It is here that the analogy of the author 
and her characters is appropriate: we have our being in God, just as the 
author's characters have their being in the world of her thoughts. The same 
is true for our decisions. My decision to vacation in Colorado is not a dis-
tinct event caused by God's willing that I so decide. Rather, it is the very 
thing God wills, the actual content of his act of commanding its existence. 
But even this does not fully reflect the closeness between God's will and 
ours. For we might accept the idea that our own being is enclosed within 
God's act of creating us, yet still be tempted to think of it as only a part of 
that act, as though the actual creating were still something apart from us. 
Even with our own decisions this is not quite right. What makes it seem 
right is that we often represent mental acts in a way that distinguishes the 
attitude or modality of the thought from its content. My decision to visit 
Colorado might be represented thus: 
I decide: I go to Colorado. 
Here the content of my decision is treated as a part of my thought, but as 
though it were separated from the act or modality of thought that is my 
deciding, making it appear as though the modality of the thought were a 
kind of operation carried out upon the content. And we could try to por-
tray God's role in my decision the same way: 
Fiat: my deciding I shall go to Colorado. 
Here the content is the real event of my deciding, but it is still represented 
separately from the modality of the divine command, again suggesting 
that God's creative activity is independent of my act of deciding, which 
counts only as a kind of object or product of it. 
But that cannot be right. Separating attitude and content in the case of 
our mental acts has some justification, since the content that enters into a 
given mental act is at times (and I think always, in the case of decision) 
conceived in advance. But even this is misrepresentative. 
Phenomenologically, to decide is not to place a modality of thought in jux-
taposition to an otherwise neutral content. It is to think the content in the 
modality in question, so that it is permeated by it. Only when content and 
modality are united is there a true decision, and the only representation 
necessary is: 
I shall go to Colorado, 
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where this is understood to be through and through a matter of resolving. 
And if we want to model God's creative activity after our acts of will, it has 
to be thought of in the same way. The modality of creating, the fiat of God, 
is held in the very products of creation. Just as my decisive resolve per-
vades my decision, so the creative power of God pervades what he creates. 
His fiat is our very being, and the being of all that we do, not an activity 
that occurs independently of its products. So the operation of God's will 
that is manifested in my deciding I shall go to Colorado is just: 
My deciding I shall go to Colorado. 
There is nothing here that stands as a determining condition of my deci-
sion, short of the decision itself. Even taking the model of mental acts at 
face value, then, there is reason to think it a mistake to view the divine fiat 
as an element of creation that stands apart from our being, as a determin-
ing condition of it. A similar result can be gotten if we realize that even the 
model of mental acts-albeit the preferred mode in both Scripture and tra-
dition for representing exercises of God's power-has shortcomings. As 
we have seen, creation cannot be a process. God is responsible for the 
being of all that is, but He does not produce it by operating to change 
something else, and He does not produce our decisions by operating on us. 
Nor is it the case, really, that the thought modalities of command or desire 
could be useful for God in the world's production. For until creation is a 
success, God alone is available to fulfill the command or satisfy the desire. 
So these aspects of the human will cannot be taken literally as representing 
the creative act. In the end, I would suggest, what truly constitutes God's 
activity as creator of the world is simply His being eternally given over to 
serving as the ground of being for the world and all that belongs to it. And 
the true manifestation of that is not some descriptive condition determin-
ing the nature of things, but rather their very existence. So as far as my 
decision is concerned, God's creative activity does not, even on the eternal 
level, stand as a determining condition which settles what I shall decide. It 
is fully manifested simply in my deciding as I do. 
Does it follow that God's activity in creating me the person who decides 
to go to Colorado is identical with my so deciding? Not by standard theo-
ries of event identity, for those require that Identical events have the same 
subject, and that is not so here. I alone am the subject of my decision. It is 
predicated of me, and its defects are mine. What God does is create the 
event of my deciding as I do. He is, as it were, the subject of my being the 
subject of my decision-which is really just an expression of the point that 
we have our being in Him. Because of this difference, God's intentions and 
mine can be different, and His reasons can embrace much more. So even if 
my decision is morally defective, God can view my making it as indispens-
able to a situation that is finally for the best. Yet none of this puts in place a 
further event by which my decision is determined. It is true, of course, that 
God's will in this cannot be opposed: I cannot decide other than God, as 
creator, has me deciding. But since the only manifestation of His will in 
this regard is my deciding, all that this limitation comes to is that I cannot 
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decide anything else while at the same time deciding as 1 do. That, of 
course, is not a limitation at all, and if libertarianism is true I am not deter-
mined by secondary causes either. Paradoxical though it may appear at 
first, therefore, even though our decisions are set in place by the creative 
power of God, we could, even on the eternal stage, have done otherwise. 
VI. Conclusion 
My claim, then, is that when He does not create determining secondary 
causes of things, God's creative will is expressed entirely in the being of 
what He creates, not in any further, metaphysical conditions that deter-
mine its nature. If, therefore, God chooses to create a being who decides 
freely, in the libertarian sense, to undertake a specific course of action, it 
will be so. As I have intimated, I am not certain how satisfying this solu-
tion will be found to be. But if it is correct, then even though God has com-
plete sovereignty over the universe, we retain complete freedom in our 
decisions, and full responsibility for them. What this responsibility comes 
to is, of course, not a simple matter. It depends, among other things, on 
exactly what the defect of our decisions that constitutes sin is, and how 
notions of eternal reward and, especially, punishment are to be under-
stood. Those must be issues for another time. But I would hope the view I 
have tried to defend will discourage simplistic solutions. The pitfall in 
according God complete sovereignty over creation is that it can leave us 
thinking we have been short-changed, that our freedom is violated in our 
very creation. One possible result is a kind of morbid predestinarianism, 
in which we resentfully admit our sinfulness, accept our salvation with a 
survivor's guilt, and then assuage both guilt and resentment by tallying the 
numbers of the damned, condemning most of our fellows before God even 
gets the chance. Alternatively, we may opt for a Pollyannaish universal-
ism, in which since we were never really to blame to begin with, salvation 
is more or less automatically extended to all, and everyone from Iscariot to 
Eichmann is okay. If I am not mistaken, both these alternatives are ways of 
refusing responsibility for our deeds, and both really make light of our sin-
fulness. A proper account of human freedom, I think, should acknowledge 
the complete majesty and providence of God without in itself licensing 
such results. If it works, the account I have proposed may be a step in that 
direction.21 
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